

B. A fourth country will be brought into the picture if the nature of the response justifies it. (Tab L—Role of France and Soviet Union.)

VI. What We Hope To Eventually Accomplish:

A. While the emissary would describe different alternative schemes for arms limitation—both public and private, unilateral and multi-lateral—we would ultimately hope to wind up with the following largely secret arrangement:

1. An undertaking by both sides not to develop, test, manufacture, or import nuclear weapons or surface-to-surface missiles which would be “strategic” in terms of the Near East.¹

2. Peaceful nuclear programs and scientific space research programs would be declared and subject to safeguards, with the nuclear program preferably subject to IAEA safeguards.

3. A cooperative arrangement for prompt access for U.S. technicians to any potential production facility for nuclears or missiles considered suspicious by the U.S. or the other country [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

B. The non-importation requirement would be intended to preclude stationing on the territory of the two countries foreign troops equipped with such arms. The non-development and testing requirement would also preclude either side from conducting this activity within a third country.

C. The inspection systems devised to accomplish this purpose would not be elaborate or formalized. A few technical personnel would be assigned to our Embassies. Visits by technical personnel would be supplemented by normal U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities.

VII. Side Benefits Even if Approach Fails:

A. Even if we do not succeed, we will have a better idea of conditions and likely sticking points by both sides for an arms control arrangement. If we should undertake another initiative in the future, we will have an important point of reference.

B. Educative effect. Both Ben-Gurion and Nasser will have a better appreciation of the problem, economic costs, and risks involved if they try to develop unconventional weapons.

C. We will have greater freedom of action in the Near East to pursue unilateral means to stop nuclear escalation.

¹ The UAR's present missiles are largely show pieces which it might retain for that purpose. Present UAR missile development would be re-directed toward prestigious outer space programs. [Footnote in the source text.]